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Abstract:  
We argue in this paper that available econometric estimates of farmers’ risk aversion do not 
measure true farmers’ preferences towards risky outcomes. Available analyses are mostly of 
static nature and indeed measure the parameters of the synthetic optimal value function rather 
than the deep parameters of the utility functions. We derive analytical and empirical results in 
a  simple  dynamic  and  stochastic  framework  showing  that  that  there  is  not  a  simple 
relationship between utility functions and value functions when agents have many decision 
variables. In particular we find that the value function does not necessarily exhibit DARA 
when  the  instantaneous  utility  function  satisfies  DARA  and  conversely.  We  recommend 





The  agricultural  sector  is  facing  many  new  risky  and  uncertain  challenges  such  as  those 
induced by the climate change. Accordingly measuring the risk aversion of farmers turns out 
to  be  nowadays  a  major  topic  in  agricultural  economics  so  as  to  understand  economic 
behaviours and design relevant policy responses. This was already crucial in order to, for 
example, assess the impacts of current policy instruments, such as the decoupled nature of 
direct payments granted to farmers in developed countries. It has been shown (for instance, 
Hennessy, 1998) that these payments have positive production effects if farmers’ preferences 
exhibit Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA), i.e. that their risk aversion decreases 
with their wealth.  
Many researches have already been conducted on the identification of farmers risk aversion, 
leading  without  surprise  to  a  great  heterogeneity  of  available  estimates.  From  the  recent 
OECD  review  of  these  estimates,  it  appears  that  studies  generally  conclude  that  farmers 
preferences exhibit risk aversion (OECD, 2009). Much more disputed is the exact structure of 
farmers’  preferences  with  respect  to  risky  outcomes.  For  instance,  focusing  on  analyses 
imposing  Constant  Relative  Risk  Aversion  (CRRA)  preferences,  average  estimates  of  the 
Arrow Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion vary from 0 to 10. This rightfully raises some 
scepticism on our ability to quantify several risk issues. Several factors can indeed explain 
such discrepancy, even when we remain with the expected utility paradigm. First Meyers and 
Meyers (2005) attribute part of the difference to the fact that different arguments are specified 
in  the  utility  function:  wealth,  income,  profit,  consumption.  When  converted  to  the  same 
argument, they show much less variation across estimates. Second Lence (2009) argue that 
farm production data do not exhibit sufficient variability in order to reveal the preferences 
towards risks. More precisely, the information contained in farm production data is generally 
too poor for the identification of both preferences and technologies, leading to potentially 
biased estimates when flexible forms are specified. Just and Just (2009) make the same point 
arguing in addition that perceived risks by farmers also need to be identified. Third Pope et 
alii (2010) recall that farmers have different solutions to cope with risk, such as consumption 
or investment decisions. These decisions should be estimated simultaneously with production 
(input) decisions to correctly assess farmers’ preferences.  
Our main objective in this paper is to emphasize that available estimates do not measure true 
farmer  preferences.  While  risk  is  inherently  a  dynamic  issue,  most  studies  develop  static 
theoretical and empirical frameworks. By such they implicitly measure the parameters of the 
optimal value function rather the deep parameters of farmers’ preferences. In their dynamic   3
analysis, Pope et alii more clearly recognize that they estimate the parameters of the value 
function rather than the parameters of the utility function. We argue that in non degenerate 
cases we cannot identify the parameters of the utility function from the estimation of the 
parameters of the value function, hence available estimates do not reflect farmers preferences 
towards risky outcomes. The intuition is that the value function captures the behaviour of 
farmers,  for  instance  the  maximization  of  the  discounted  expected  utility,  subject  to 
technological and budget constraints. Accordingly the parameters of the value function are not 
only  determined  by  the  parameters  of  the  farmers’  preferences  but  also  by,  at  least,  the 
parameters of production technologies.  
From a technical point, value functions have not in general cases closed form solutions. In 
order to overcome this technical difficulty, we adopt two complementary strategies. First we 
theoretically demonstrate that the value function does not inherit from all properties of the 
utility function. In particular, we prove that the value function does not necessarily exhibit 
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) if the underlying utility function is DARA. Our 
analytical  demonstration  shows  that  the  properties  of  the  value  function  depend  on  the 
properties of the response functions, in particular the consumption function. It appears that 
these  properties  cannot  be  determined  unambiguously  when  economic  agents  have  many 
decision variables. It should be noted here that Carroll and Kimball (1996) for instance were 
able to demonstrate the concavity of the consumption function and the DARA property of the 
value function because consumers maximise their value function only over consumption. This 
result cannot be extended to the case of multiple decision variables as in our setting where 
producers determine, at least, both consumption and production levels. Second we conduct 
numerical  experiments  where  we  first  impose  parameters  of  the  utility  and  production 
functions  using  flexible  forms  and  then  compute  the  optimal  levels  of  production, 
consumption and ultimately the value function. We then estimate the parameters of the value 
function using again flexible forms and a classical adjustment method. We test the equality of 
these estimates to the original preference parameters. We conduct several sensitivity analyses 
of  our  results  to  the  original  values  of  preferences  and  technological  parameters.  Our 
empirical results reveal that estimates of value function parameters strongly differ from the 
values of our deep parameters. We also find that the value  function does not necessarily 
exhibit DARA when the instantaneous utility function satisfies DARA. We also find that the 
Arrow Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion is systematically lower for the value function. 
The bias depends, as expected, on the extent of supply responses to economic incentives.  
This paper is organized in two parts. In the first part, we conduct our analytical demonstration 
using a voluntary simple setting such as to already reveal that the properties of the value 
function are different from the properties of the utility function. More precisely, we first show 
that the value function may not exhibit DARA even if the utility function is DARA. On the 
other hand, we show that the value function is concave with respect to initial wealth if the 
utility function is concave with respect to consumption. The second part is devoted to the 
empirical  analysis.  We  first  detail  our  calibration  assumptions  and  then  comment  our 
quantitative results. We conclude the paper with methodological recommendations.  
 
2.  Theoretical analysis 
2.a. Assumptions 
Farmers  around  the  world  are  confronted  with  many  sources  of  risks  (such  as  price, 
production,  environmental,  quality,…)  and  can  manage  their  exposure  to  and  the 
consequences of risks through many technical and financial decisions (such as the choice of 
activities,  cropping  patterns,  investment,  insurance  contracts,  participation  to  future  and   4
options markets, savings and borrowing decisions, …). Pope et alii convincingly argue that all 
these dimensions should be integrated in the analysis in order to identify the deep parameters.  
In  this  paper,  we  consider  a  very  simple  framework  in  order  to  analyze  the  relationship 
between the instantaneous utility function and the dynamic value function. We consider a 
farmer with two independent decisions only, his periodic final consumption and the periodic 
production  of  an  agricultural  good.  Periodic  savings  are  directly  given  by  the  difference 
between the initial periodic wealth and periodic final expenditures. We also assume that only 
the price of this agricultural good is stochastic while wealth is accumulated in a riskless asset. 
Regarding the dynamic behavior of our farmer, we again simplify the framework by assuming 
that he maximizes a time additive present discounted value of utility from consumption. As 
usual (see for instance, Carroll and Kimball), we focus on the last two periods for analytical 
computations. We work backwards from the last period where we assume that the farmer 
consumes all remaining wealth.  
Formally, we consider a two-period consumption-production model with an economic agent 
(farmer) choosing his consumption level   and his production level  (or input level) at time 
t. His wealth at period t is given as   where   is the agent’s saving level at time t. 
We assume that the agent has enough wealth to live at period t, thus  . For the 
last period, the agent’s random wealth is given by 
                 (1) 
where   is his net random return of production   in state  . We assume that this return 
function  is concave in .   is the fixed total rate of return of the safe asset. Note that ( ,  
are functions of   and we do not a priori know the curvature of   and . The 
agent’s utility function for consumption at time t is   which is increasing and strictly 
concave in c and we assume first that this function exhibits DARA, thus  
 
or equivalently,   
It  is  clear  that   since  the  other  two  terms  are  always  positive.  It  means  that  the 
marginal utility function for consumption is convex in the agent’s consumption level  . 
Now, the agent’s value function can be written as follows: 
   (2) 
In this Bellman equation,   is a conditional expectation on the information set available at 
t,  is the agent’s discount factor. We assume that the additive utility function at the last 
period    is monotonic increasing, strictly concave and it also exhibits DARA, thus 
we  have   and .  In  Carroll  and  Kimball,  they  have  succeed  to 
show that   is DARA if   is DARA, but this is just a particular case and this is no 
longer true in our model which will be shown later. For the agent, his objective is to find 
optimal (c, x) in order to maximize his value function . Thus the above equation can be 
given as 
            (3)   5
Subject to      
The first order condition (FOC) give us the optimal choices ( ) which are 
         (4) 
             (5) 
Using the implicit theorem, we can also obtain the first derivative of the value function as:  
                 (6) 
Equation (4) and (6) give us the follows equality 
                    (7) 
It should be clear here that, even if we know the properties of , we still do not know the 
properties of the agent’s consumption function, so we can’t already determine the properties 
of the first derivate of the value function. 
2.b. On the DARA property of the value function 
We now show that the DARA property of   cannot be proved even when we know that the 
utility function for consumption   and the additive utility function   (for the 
last  period)  exhibit  DARA.  To  prove  this  point,  we  need  to  determine  if  the  following 
inequality is satisfied . So we derive equation (2) in  to get the three 
terms .  
We now differentiate equation (6) to get: 
 
             (8) 
A third derivation gives us 
 
 
Now,  we  want  to  show  that   is  impossible  to  be  proved.  Using 
equations (7) to (9), this expression is given by: 
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While we know the derivatives of the value function evaluated at the last period, we are 
unable to unambiguously determine the sign of the expression (10) for the three following 
reasons.  First  the  sign  of  this  equation  depends  on  the  curvature  of   and   which  are 
unknown (see the last term of the right hand side). Second both the second and third terms in 
the right hand side includes a weighted formula of the DARA condition of the utility function. 
The weight is given by the derivative of the stochastic return function in the second term, by 
the square of this derivate in the third term. Third, the second term involves the derivatives of 
the consumption and production function with respect to initial wealth. This dependency on 
first order derivatives of response functions is not new. In their portfolio choice problems, 
Roy and Wagenwoort (1996) also find that the value function exhibit DARA if the underlying 
utility function is DARA and if the derivative of their investment function with respect to 
wealth is lower than one. Our formula is more complex because we have two independent 
decision variables: the derivative of the production function with respect to the initial wealth 
is also crucial. We can unambiguously determine the sign of the consumption derivative but 
not the derivate of production with respect to production (see below equations 17 and 18).  
So we are left with three sources of indeterminacy. Now we show that this expression can be 
unambiguously  determined  only  in  very  specific  cases.  Let  first  assume  that  the  return 
function  is  linear  which  means  that   where  only  the  last  parameter  is 
stochastic. In this case   and  so that we can simplify the equation (10) and 
resolve one source of ambiguity:   7
 
From the above, we can see that even the return function is linear, we still cannot distinguish 
the properties of the value function. In particular we still don’t know the curvature of    and   
which ensures our finding. In the second case, let’s assume that the agent’s return function is 
exogenous but stochastic, thus . In this case, the equation (10) simplifies to: 
 
This is in fact the case specified by Carroll and Kimball(1996). These authors were able to 
determine that the value function is DARA because there is only one choice variable which is 
not “directly” to the stochastic variable. From this result, these authors were then able to show 
that the optimal consumption rule   is concave. 
2.c. On the concavity of the value function 
To  show  the  concavity  of  the  agent’s  value  function ,  Fama(1970)  has  shown  that 
 is monotone increasing and strictly concave in ( if the agent’s additive 
utility function for the next period   is monotone increasing and strictly concave in 
. One big different between our model and Fama’s model is that Fama’s model is 
based on multi-period while our model has only 2 period. Nonetheless we can follow the logic 
of his demonstration. 
We first need to show first that  is monotonic increasing and strictly concave in (x, s). We 
change the consumption function   by   in order to simplify notations. To demonstrate 
this point, we take the FOC of equation (2) 
           (13) 
where  ) , ( s x z =  . Differentiating these FOCs leads us to: 
 
  (14)   8
In this matrix,   and   are both negative since   is monotone 
increasing and strictly concave in  and   is concave in  , so we can say that   is 
concave in (x, s). Nevertheless, we can show that the determinant of matrix  is 





Then, we want to show that . To do this, we define first  which is the derivative 
of equation (7) in  : 
                (16) 




Returning to the production and saving functions, we get the expression:  
                  (17) 
And 
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             (18) 
The sign of   is the same of that of . At this stage, it is interesting to 
note that if the derivative of the return function to the production is always positive, then an 
increase in initial wealth induces a production decrease. By extension, a lump sum payment 
has a negative production effect if the marginal profit evaluated at the initial point is positive. 
This result is at the opposite of Hennessy’s conclusion (1998) where the distinction between 
value and utility functions is not made. Conversely, this lump-sum payment is “coupled” to 
the production if the marginal profit evaluated without this lump sum payment is negative. 
More generally our result may partly explain the debates of the decoupled nature of farm 
subsidy. When consumption is included in the analysis, their coupling effect may be lower as 
empirically suggested by Whitaker (2009) in the US case.  





                                                                                        (19) 





We thus find that the value function is concave even when the agents have two independent 
decision variables.  
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3.  Empirical analysis 
The theoretical analysis shows that the value function may not be of the DARA type when the 
instantaneous utility is DARA. We are nevertheless unable to identify explicit cases where we 
are  certain  that  the  value  function  is  not  DARA.  Furthermore  we  are  not  able  to  link 
parameters of the utility function to the parameters of the value function. We now proceed 
with simulations to eventually find cases where inheritance properties fail. We first justify our 
calibration procedures and then comments on our results. 
3.a. Empirical assumptions 
Any empirical analysis inevitably depends on the specifications of functional forms or data 
used. In order to be quite general, we specify rather flexible forms and test our results to 
different calibration points. More precisely, we use the Expo-Power utility function initially 
proposed by Saha (1993). This function is given by:  
 with   
The Arrow Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion is given by:  
 
Thus the utility function exhibits DARA if , CARA when   and  IARA  when 
. In all simulations, we fix the constant   to 1.1 and will consider different values for 
the two other parameters. In the central case, we assume that these two parameters equal 0.5.  
Regarding the production side of our model, we assume that the technology is resumed by a 
quadratic  cost  function.  The  marginal  cost  function  is  thus  linear  with  respect  to  the 
production level. Parameters of the marginal cost function are calibrated such as to target a 
price supply elasticity when both production and output price equal one. There are obviously 
also great uncertainties to the true value of this elasticity because they depend on the risk 
aversion  of  farmers.  We  thus  consider  two  successive  calibrations,  one  when  the  supply 
elasticity equals 0.5 and one when it equals 0.1. We make clear here that these are the values 
for the calibration at one point (when both price and production equals one); the true ex post 
elasticity obviously varies with the production (and price) levels.  
The price of the agricultural good is the sole stochastic variable. We assume that it follows a 
normal law with mean one and standard error 0.2, so a coefficient of variation of 20 per cent. 
Finally we assume that the discount factor (β) equals one and the return of the safe asset (r ) 
equals one as well.  
 
3.b. Empirical results 
 
We solve the optimization program for different (one hundred) initial values of the initial 
wealth of our farmer (from 0.5 to 5, so that initial wealth range from 50 per cent to 500 per 
cent  of  annual  average  revenue).  We  then  obtain  the  optimal  values  of  production, 
consumption and ultimately the optimal level of the value function. We then perform a simple 
adjustment of these optimal values to the initial level of wealth assuming an Expo Power 
value function:  
 
Because this function is highly nonlinear, we provide initial points to facilitate convergence. 
The  initial  points  equal  the  values  of  the  deep  parameters.  Results  of  our  estimation  for 
different values of utility parameters are reported in the following tables.    11 
In the table 1, we only change the value of the   deep parameter which mostly governs the 
Arrow Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The parameters of the cost function ensure 
0.5 supply elasticity at the mean point and without risk. When both deep parameters equal 0.5 
and thus the utility function is DARA, we also find that the value function parameters ensure 
DARA. The estimation value of the  2 v  parameter is significantly lower than one. On the other 
hand, the estimated parameters are significantly different from the deep parameters. One is 
greater and the other is lower. We then compute the Arrow Pratt coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion at different points. For instance, at the mean point of consumption, this coefficient 
equals 0.45 while it equals 0.23 at the mean wealth level (figures not shown in table 1). In fact 
we observe at all points that the Arrow Pratt coefficient computed with the value function is 
lower (roughly equal one half) than the coefficient computed with the utility function at the 
optimal consumption level. Both coefficients are always positive and thus the concavity is 
effectively satisfied.  
We  then  perform  the  same  computations  now  assuming  that  the   parameter  equals  0.8. 
While  the  utility  function  still  exhibit  DARA  preferences,  it  appears  that  the  estimated 
parameters of the value function no longer ensure DARA: the estimate of the   parameter is 
statistically greater than one, so the value function exhibit IARA. At the mean point, we again 
find  that  the  Arrow  Pratt  coefficient  of  absolute  risk  aversion  evaluated  with  the  value 
function is lower (0.28) than the coefficient with the utility function (0.46). So the concavity 
is still satisfied at the mean point. Table 1 also provides results with other values for the   
parameters.  These  results  basically  suggest  a  positive  relationship  between  the  deep  and 
estimated parameters.  
Table 2 provides the same results when we now assume a supply elasticity of 0.1 at the mean 
point without risk. As expected results are much positive in the sense that the value function 
always exhibit DARA when the utility function is also DARA. This makes sense because, as 
we show in the analytical section, the properties of the value function depend on the curvature 
of the supply function. By reducing the response of production to economic incentives, we 
expect less production effects due to changes in initial wealth levels. Again there are some 
differences between the deep parameters and the estimated ones. The Arrow Pratt coefficients 
of absolute risk aversion are again positive with the value one being roughly half the utility 
one.  On  the  other  hand,  we  find  that  the  value  function  exhibit  DARA  while  the  utility 
function is IARA (when   equals 1.3). So a DARA value function may be also generated by 
non DARA utility functions. While this is not contradicted by the theory, this raises another 
difficulty with present available estimates of risk aversion.  
Finally we modify the range of initial wealth levels. We now assume a narrow range (from 50 
per cent to 150 per cent of average revenue) because additional production effects are very 
limited when we start from high initial wealth. Results reported in table 3 show the robustness 
of our central results.  
 
4.  Concluding comments 
While  knowing  the  risk  aversion  of  farmers  is  of  crucial  interest  in  many  agricultural 
economic issues, we are far from a consensus on the magnitude of farmers’ risk aversion. We 
argue that available econometric estimates do not measure farmers’ preferences towards risky 
outcomes. Analyses are mostly of static nature and indeed measure the parameters of the 
optimal value function rather than the deep parameters of the utility functions.    12 
This paper shows theoretically and empirically that there is not a simple relationship between 
utility  functions  and  value  functions  when  agents  have  many  decision  variables.  More 
precisely we analytically prove in a simple setting with two independent decision variables 
(production and consumption) and no market failures that the value function used in many 
studies may not verify DARA when the utility satisfies this condition. On the other hand, we 
find that the value function is concave with respect to wealth when utility is concave with 
respect to consumption. When we restrict our framework to one decision variable, we end up 
with well established results. Furthermore our empirical results reveal that the estimates of 
value function parameters strongly differ from the values of our deep parameters. We also 
find that the value function does not necessarily exhibit DARA when the instantaneous utility 
function satisfies DARA and conversely. The estimated Arrow Pratt coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion is systematically lower for the value function. The bias with the deep parameter 
depends, as expected, on the extent of supply responses to economic incentives. 
Accordingly  our  recommendation  is  to  perform  new  econometric  estimation  of  farmers’ 
attitude toward risks with at least two new dimensions. First these estimations should be 
dynamic  using  Euler  type  equations.  Second  these  estimations  should  include  final 
consumption  expenditures  of  farmers  so  as  to  identify  the  true  deep  parameters.  More 
generally,  we  believe  like  Pope  et  alii  that  due  account  should  be  made  on  the  different 
decision variables available to farmers.  
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Table 1. Econometric estimates of the value function parameters given deep parameters 
(supply elasticity calibrated to 0.5) 
5 . 0 , 1 . 1 1 0 = = u u  
  0.2  0.5  0.8  1  1.3 




















Source: our computations (standard errors in parentheses) 
Table 2. Econometric estimates of the value function parameters given deep parameters 
(supply elasticity calibrated to 0.1) 
5 . 0 , 1 . 1 1 0 = = u u  
  0.2  0.5  0.8  1  1.3 




















Source: our computations (standard errors in parentheses) 
Table 3. Econometric estimates of the value function parameters given deep parameters 
(supply elasticity calibrated to 0.5, restricted range for the initial wealth) 
5 . 0 , 1 . 1 1 0 = = u u  
  0.2  0.6  0.8  1  1.3 




















Source: our computations (standard errors in parentheses) 